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OPINION OF THE COURT
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Patricia McGuirk Geraci sued her employer, alleging that she
had been unlawfully terminated because she was pregnant.

The

district court granted summary judgment to Geraci's employer
because she had not shown that the employer knew Geraci was
pregnant when it terminated her.

The district court held that

given this evidentiary hiatus, Geraci could not make out a prima
facie case of pregnancy discrimination.

We will affirm.

I.
The facts of this case are set forth in the district court's
thorough opinion, and we need only summarize.

See Geraci v.

Moody-Tottrup Int'l, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 241, 243-45 (W.D. Pa.
1995).

Moody-Tottrup is in the business of inspecting pipe and

other materials.

It hired Geraci in 1987 as a Clerk Typist but

consistently promoted her, until she became an Inspection
Coordinator in 1991.

It appears from the record that Geraci was

an exemplary employee during her tenure at Moody.
In the last week of 1992, Geraci suspected that she was
pregnant and performed a home pregnancy test; the results were
positive.

She decided not to inform management at that time,

however, fearing that she would not receive her annual raise
scheduled for January or February.

Geraci did tell six of her

twenty co-workers (none of whom were members of management), but
specifically asked them not to tell her superiors.

There is no

evidence that any of them did so, nor that management was
otherwise informed of Geraci's pregnancy at that time.
In late January 1993, management laid Geraci off because of
a decline in company revenue.

It is undisputed that Moody

decided to lay Geraci off in mid-December, before Geraci herself
knew she was pregnant, but that it delayed telling her so as not
to ruin her holidays.
When she was laid off, Geraci asked whether Moody would
rehire her should business improve.

Moody management advised her

that she would not be rehired, and that she should look for
another job.

Geraci then told Moody that she was pregnant. Moody

continued her health care benefits until after the baby was born
and gave her three weeks severance pay.
A few months later, an advertisement appeared in the local
newspaper for what appeared to be the same position from which
Geraci had been terminated.

According to Moody, this position

arose to fill a large Malaysian contract, but the "Malaysian
people" wanted an inspection coordinator with "hands-on"
experience, which Geraci lacked.

In any event, Geraci did not

apply for this position, believing that it would be futile. Moody
asserts that because the Malaysian contract did not materialize,
the position was never filled.
In June 1994, after exhausting her administrative remedies,
Geraci filed this suit in district court, alleging that Moody
terminated her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, specifically 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e(k). After
discovery, Moody moved for summary judgment, asserting that,

because there was no evidence that anyone in management knew
Geraci was pregnant (either when Moody decided to terminate her
or when it informed her of its decision), Moody could not have
unlawfully discharged her because of her pregnancy.
court agreed.

The district

See Geraci, 905 F. Supp. at 245-48.
II.
A.

Geraci has no direct evidence of unlawful discrimination.
Instead, she bases her suit on the familiar burden-shifting
framework first enunciated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973) and
Texas Dep't of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56,
101 S. Ct. 1089, 1093-95 (1981).

Under that framework, Geraci

must first make out a prima facie case of unlawful
discrimination.

Once she has done so, the burden of production

then shifts to Moody to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for discharging her, at which point the presumption of
discrimination arising from the prima facie case drops away,
leaving the burden on Geraci to prove that Moody's proffered
reasons were pretextual.
Here, Moody argues that we need not consider its reasons for
terminating Geraci or whether they were pretextual, because
Geraci failed to meet her threshold burden.

We therefore begin

by determining the elements of the prima facie case of pregnancy
discrimination, aware that, if Geraci failed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact as to any of those elements, summary

judgment was properly granted.

E.g., Fowle v. C & C Cola, 868

F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 1989).
B.
Were Geraci alleging that Moody terminated her solely
because she is a woman, she could make out her prima facie case
by merely showing that she is a member of a protected class, that
she was qualified for her position, and that she was discharged
"under conditions that give rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination."

Burdine, 450 U.S at 253, 101 S. Ct. at 1093.

Although often overlooked, the requirement that the adverse
employment action occur "under circumstances that give rise to an
inference of unlawful discrimination" is a critical one that
weighs heavily in this case.
The McDonnell Douglas-Burdine burden-shifting framework was
created because only rarely will a plaintiff have direct evidence
of discrimination.

Gone are the days (if, indeed, they ever

existed) when an employer would admit to firing an employee
because she is a woman, over forty years of age, disabled or a
member of a certain race or religion.

To allow those genuinely

victimized by discrimination a fair opportunity to prevail,
courts will presume that, once the plaintiff has shown the above
elements, unlawful discrimination was the most likely reason for
the adverse personnel action.

The elements of that prima facie

case, however, must not be applied woodenly, but must rather be
tailored flexibly to fit the circumstances of each type of
illegal discrimination.

See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802

n.13, 93 S. Ct. at 1824 n.13; Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825,
830 (3d Cir. 1994).
The traditional McDonnell Douglas-Burdine presumption quite
properly makes no reference to the employer's knowledge of
membership in a protected class because, in the vast majority of
discrimination cases, the plaintiff's membership is either patent
(race or gender), or is documented on the employee's personnel
record (age discrimination).

This case, however, is different.

We cannot presume that an employer most likely practiced unlawful
discrimination when it does not know that the plaintiff even
belongs to the protected class.

The employer's knowledge, in

this class of cases, is a critical element of the plaintiff's
prima facie case.

Indeed, it is counterintuitive to infer that

the employer discriminated on the basis of a condition of which
it is wholly ignorant, and in this situation the bare McDonnell
Douglas presumption no longer makes sense.
In other cases involving personal attributes not obvious to
the employer, courts have regularly held that the plaintiff
cannot make out a prima facie case of discrimination unless he or
she proves that the employer knew about the plaintiff's
particular personal characteristic.

An employee's religion, for

example, is often unknown to the employer, and we have
accordingly required employees to inform their employers of their
religious beliefs in order to make out a prima facie case of
discrimination based on failure to make reasonable
accommodations.

See Protos v. Volkswagen, Inc., 797 F.2d 129,

133 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 972, 107 S. Ct. 474 (1986).

The same rule applies when the plaintiff alleges that she was
discharged on account of her religion.

See Beasley v. Health

Care Serv. Corp., 940 F.2d 1085, 1088 (7th Cir. 1991).
Likewise, disabilities are often unknown to the employer,
and, because of that, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
defendant employer knew of the disability to state a prima facie
case of unlawful discharge.

See Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Tel.

Co., 47 F.3d 928, 932-33 (7th Cir. 1995).

In Hedberg, a case

filed under the Americans With Disabilities Act, a manager
claimed he was dismissed because he had a life-threatening
disease, but the court held that he must show that the employer
knew of his illness, reasoning that an employer cannot fire
someone because of a disability it knows nothing about.

Id.;

accord Morisky v. Broward County, No. 95-4808, 1996 WL 137386, *3
(11th Cir. Apr. 11, 1996) (per curiam); Landefeld v. Marion Gen.
Hosp., 994 F.2d 1178, 1181-82 (6th Cir. 1993) (Rehabilitation Act
of 1973).
Pregnancy, of course, is different in that its obviousness
varies, both temporally and as between different affected
individuals.

It is difficult to imagine that an employer would

not be aware that an employee is in the later stages of her
pregnancy; at least if the employer sees the employee.

When the

pregnancy is apparent, or where plaintiff alleges that she has
disclosed it to the employer, then a question of the employer's
knowledge would likely preclude summary judgment.

If the

pregnancy is not apparent and the employee has not disclosed it
to her employer, she must allege knowledge and present, as part

of her prima facie case, evidence from which a rational jury
could infer that the employer knew that she was pregnant.
III.
The application of this legal framework to the facts of
Geraci's case need not detain us long.

Geraci was not visibly

pregnant; indeed, even Geraci herself did not know until shortly
before she told her coworkers.

She did not tell Moody

management, and she requested that the six friends and co-workers
to whom she disclosed her pregnancy not tell management.
Geraci argues that because she told six out of twenty coworkers that she was pregnant and that her pregnancy became a
"common topic of discussion in the office," management must have
known it before they terminated her.

But her managers filed

declarations disclaiming knowledge, and Geraci presented no
evidence to the contrary.

Geraci deposed only one of those co-

workers whom she told of her pregnancy, and he testified that he
did not tell management that she was pregnant.

Thus, Geraci

would have us remand this case for trial on the sheer speculation
that one or more of the people she entrusted with highly personal
information violated her confidence and that members of Moody
management lied about their lack of knowledge.

This is simply

insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.

See

Hedberg, 47 F.2d at 932 (speculation about employer's knowledge
of disability does not create a genuine issue of material fact;
"instead, it creates a false issue, the demolition of which is a
primary goal of summary judgment").

Moody also points to undisputed evidence in the record that
it decided to lay Geraci off before even she knew she was
pregnant.

Again, Geraci offers only speculation that Moody must

have really made its decision to terminate her in January rather
than in December.

For the reasons already set forth, we must

reject that speculation.
Finally, Geraci relies on Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759,
765 (3d Cir. 1994), for the proposition that a "pattern of
discrimination" and evidence that defendant's asserted nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext, supports an inference that
defendant knew that she was pregnant.

That contention is

illogical and unsupported by that case.
In Fuentes, we did say that a pattern of discrimination
could support an inference of pretext, but we did not hold that
evidence of pretext makes out the plaintiff's prima facie case.
Indeed, such a holding would make no sense.

Essentially, Geraci

argues that because Moody had treated women (including pregnant
women) badly in the past, it must have known that Geraci was
pregnant, because she was treated badly.

This is flawed

reasoning which warrants no discussion.
All of Geraci's remaining contentions go to the issue of
pretext and given our conclusion that she has failed to make out
a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination, we need not
discuss them.
IV.

We find error in neither the district court's reasoning nor
its conclusion that Geraci failed to state a prima facie case. We
will therefore affirm its summary judgment.
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Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

